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Abstract
We analyze optimal ﬁnancial structure for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting for
feedback eﬀects in secondary asset markets. By issuing suﬃcient debt, the incumbent creates
overhang and credibly commits against acquiring entrant assets. This depresses asset values
and entrant returns, thus reducing the likelihood of entry. The cost of debt overhang is that
the incumbent fails to make positive NPV acquisitions if entry deterrence fails. The implied
trade-oﬀ between ex post eﬃciency and entry deterrence explains why growth ﬁrms eschew debt
while value ﬁrms issue public debt. Contrary to the traditional view, if predation is feasible,
the case for shallow pockets is potentially stronger, since an unlevered incumbent prefers to
acquire whereas a levered incumbent responds to entry with predation. Since predation reduces
entrant returns and acquisitions raise them, the entry deterrence beneﬁtf r o ms h a l l o wp o c k e t si s
magniﬁed if predation is feasible. Optimal entrant contracts depend upon incumbent ﬁnancial
structure, with higher debt capacity and stronger ﬁnancier ownership rights if the incumbent has
deep pockets.
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We analyze optimal ﬁnancial structure for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting for feed-
back eﬀects in secondary asset markets. By issuing suﬃcient debt, the incumbent creates overhang
and credibly commits against acquiring entrant assets. This depresses asset values and entrant
returns, thus reducing the likelihood of entry. The cost of debt overhang is that the incumbent
fails to make positive NPV acquisitions if entry deterrence fails. The implied trade-oﬀ between ex
post eﬃciency and entry deterrence explains why growth ﬁrms eschew debt while value ﬁrms issue
public debt. Contrary to the traditional view, if predation is feasible, the case for shallow pockets is
potentially stronger, since an unlevered incumbent prefers to acquire whereas a levered incumbent
responds to entry with predation. Since predation reduces entrant returns and acquisitions raise
them, the entry deterrence beneﬁt from shallow pockets is magniﬁed if predation is feasible. Op-
timal entrant contracts depend upon incumbent ﬁnancial structure, with higher debt capacity and
stronger ﬁnancier ownership rights if the incumbent has deep pockets.
Keywords: Financial Flexibility, Market Entry, Acquisition, Exit Values, Preda-
tion, Financial Contracting, Product Market Competition.
JEL: G32, G34.According to conventional wisdom, the deep pockets of an incumbent deter entry. In this view,
potential entrants fear that the incumbent will utilize ﬁnancial slack to ﬁnance predatory behavior,
e.g. advertising targeted against rivals. Missing in this well-known argument is the fact that an
incumbent may use his ﬁnancial strength not only for predation, but also for acquisition. In this
paper, we show that once the acquisition option is taken into account, the deep pockets of an
incumbent may actually serve to encourage entry.
Our argument is simple. The willingness of ﬁnanciers to provide funding to entrants is determined
in large part by expected asset prices in the event of exit. Gompers (1995) ﬁnds that the majority
of VC-backed projects end in either trade sales (38%) or bankruptcy auctions (25%). In both cases,
an incumbent is the natural asset buyer. Consistent with this view, Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
argue that, “When ﬁrms have trouble meeting debt payments and sell assets or are liquidated, the
highest valuation potential buyers of these assets are likely to be other ﬁrms in the industry.” By
maintaining deep pockets, an incumbent conveys to the market his ability to purchase entrant assets.
This increases expected exit prices, relaxes ﬁnancing constraints, and stimulates entry.
In order to deter entry, the incumbent would like to claim that it will not acquire entrants.
However, such a claim is not credible (subgame perfect) for an unlevered ﬁrm. Once entry has taken
place, an acquisition is a positive NPV investment for an unlevered incumbent since this allows
him to recapture market power. However, by taking on suﬃcient debt, and exposing itself to the
debt overhang eﬀect posited by Myers (1977), the incumbent makes a credible commitment against
participating in secondary asset markets. Thus, we identify a strategic rationale for corporate
leverage as a device that helps reduce expected asset values and deter entry. This novel rationale
for public debt is the ﬁrst insight provided by the model.
We identify the following trade-oﬀ. Although debt helps to depress asset values, entry deterrence
will not always succeed. For example, if entry costs are lower than expected, entry will still occur
despite depressed asset values. The shallow pockets strategy is then costly, since a levered incumbent
fails to acquire the successful entrant even though such an acquisition would be a positive-NPV
1investment. Further, if leverage is extremely high, the incumbent will be unwilling to ﬁnance
predatory attacks ex post. Ex post ineﬃciency is the dark side of debt overhang. We show that
the shallow pockets strategy dominates deep pockets only if the value gain from entry deterrence
is larger than the ex ante expected value of making positive-NPV investments in response to entry.
Identifying this trade-oﬀ is the second insight provided by the model.
The analysis of the strategic implications of shallow pockets leads us to a reappraisal of the
relationship between predation and ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. This is the third novel insight of our model.
The traditional view, based on Telser (1966) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), argues that main-
taining a deep pocket (“long purse”) is especially attractive if the incumbent has the ability to prey
on entrants, since ﬁnancial slack is necessary to fund predatory activities. We show that the tradi-
tional view does not hold if the incumbent also enjoys the option to acquire entrants. The reasoning
is simple. If entry occurs, an unlevered incumbent will generally opt for an acquisition since this
is the eﬃcient response and is sure to eliminate the competitor from the market. Predation on the
other hand is inherently uncertain, as argued by Telser (1966) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
However, with a suﬃciently high level of debt, the incumbent’s preferences are tilted towards less
costly investments in predatory activities, despite their having a chance of failing. From an ex ante
perspective, it can be optimal to adopt a levered ﬁnancial structure that renders predation incentive
compatible ex post, since predation discourages entry whereas acquisitions encourage entry.
The optimal entrant ﬁnancial contract depends on incumbent capital structure, but the nature
of this relationship is the opposite of the traditional view (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990),
with shallow rather thand e e pp o c k e t sl i m i t i n gﬁnancier returns and the power of incentives. Our
fourth insight is to highlight this eﬀect. In our model, the entrant manager must rely upon outside
ﬁnancing and project returns are privately observed. The incentive contract uses ownership rights
as a carrot to induce the manager to disgorge some portion of ﬁrst-stage returns to the ﬁnancier. In
this setting, the deep pockets of an incumbent relax the ﬁnancing constraint through two distinct
channels. First, if the incentive contract calls for the manager to forfeit ownership, the ﬁnancier
2receives a higher price in his asset auction if the incumbent has deep pockets. The second channel
is more subtle. If the incumbent has deep pockets, the manager places a high value on retaining
ownership — since there is a high valuation buyer in the market for the entrant’s assets. This
sweetening of the carrot increases managerial incentives and allows the ﬁnancier to extract all ﬁrst-
stage proﬁt while retaining stronger ownership rights for himself. Both eﬀects raise the ﬁnancier’s
return, increasing the likelihood of project funding.
Our model is most closely related to that developed by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). Both
models consider a self-ﬁnanced incumbent (with a “long purse”) facing the threat of entry by an
entrepreneur reliant upon outside ﬁnancing (in an optimal contracting environment with hidden
cash ﬂows). The model of Bolton and Scharfstein oﬀers a rigorous foundation for the traditional
argument in favor of incumbents maintaining a deep pocket. The diﬀerence in conclusions between
the two models stems from two critical diﬀerences in underlying assumptions. First, Bolton and
Scharfstein consider a setting where the only punishment available to the ﬁnancier is to “liquidate”
the project at an exogenous payoﬀ of zero. Their second assumption, related to the ﬁrst, is that the
incumbent cannot acquire the entrant. The assumptions of Bolton and Scharfstein are appropriate
in settings where regulators prohibit acquisitions. However, the empirical evidence cited above
suggests that incumbents frequently acquire entrants. Further, in the U.S., regulators are often
willing to waive antitrust objections for ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress.
Our paper is naturally related to Myers (1977) since all eﬀects of leverage stem from the presence
or absence of debt overhang. An important contribution of Myers’ model is that it helps to explain
why growth ﬁrms avoid debt. It fails, however, to explain why any ﬁrms issue debt. In his model,
optimal debt is zero, and strictly so for a ﬁrm holding any growth options. In contrast, our model
demonstrates a beneﬁt of debt overhang linked to entry deterrence. As we show, this beneﬁti s
particularly large for value ﬁrms. This novel explanation for the use of public debt is also robust to
Zwiebel’s (1996) critique of agency-based theories and Miller’s (1977) critique of tax-based theories.
Our model is related to, but logically distinct from, existing papers arguing that debt serves
3as an entry deterrent. This literature is uniformly based on the premise that leverage encourages
an incumbent to be more aggressive in quantity or price setting. As shown by Brander and Lewis
(1986) and Maksimovic (1988), limited liability causes equity to consider only non-default states
in choosing its optimal strategy. This may encourage the levered ﬁrm to choose a more aggressive
policy than an unlevered ﬁrm. McAndrews and Nakamura (1992) and Fulghieri and Nagarajan
(1996) argue that such eﬀects make debt an entry deterrent. However, as discussed below, the eﬀect
of debt on the ﬁrm’s pricing and output strategies is sensitive to the product market setup. Further,
existing empirical evidence suggests that, if anything, levered ﬁrms are less aggressive in setting
prices and quantities.
First, Showalter (1995) shows the eﬀect of debt on quantity in a static Cournot game changes sign
according to whether non-default states correspond to high demand or low costs. Faure-Grimaud
(2000) and Povel and Raith (2004) show the eﬀect of debt in a static Cournot game is sensitive to
whether absolute priority is obeyed in default. Diﬀerent results are also obtained in multi-period
models. Whereas in many dynamic models debt fosters competition (e.g. Maksimovic, 1988), in
the model of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), debt induces less aggressive behavior as the prospect
of default reduces investments in market share. In a closely related paper, Dasgupta and Titman
(1998) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of leverage on behavior in product markets depends upon whether the
ﬁrm is a Stackelberg leader.
Second, theories predicting that leverage induces aggressive quantity or price setting are at odds
with a large body of empirical evidence. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) ﬁnd that supermarket
chains that undertook leveraged buyouts cut prices less aggressively in downturns. Campello (2003)
ﬁnds that high leverage ﬁrms tend to lose market share to low leverage ﬁrms during downturns.
Similar evidence is presented by Phillips (1994), Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Zingales (1998) and
Khanna and Tice (2005).
The basic causal mechanism in our model is robust to these critiques. This is because the
proposed theory of entry deterrence invokes a radically diﬀerent transmission channel, namely, the
4levered incumbent committing itself against acquiring entrants’ assets in bankruptcy auctions and
trade sales. In the interest of logical clarity, our model deliberately rules out any direct eﬀect of
leverage on price or quantity decisions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the product market and derives
equilibrium asset prices. Section 2 derives the optimal entrant contract. Section 3 identiﬁes con-
ditions under which shallow pockets is an optimal strategy for the incumbent in a setting with no
predation. Section 4 extends the baseline model by allowing the incumbent to choose between pre-
dation and acquisition in response to entry. Section 5 allows the incumbent to engage in predation
and acquisition sequentially. Section 6 discusses empirical evidence. Section 7 concludes.
1. The Model
This section begins by describing the product market. We then move on to a discussion of price
determination in the secondary market for the entrant’s assets.
1.1. Timing and Payoﬀs
Figure 1 provides a time-line of events in the baseline model. We follow Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990) in assuming the incumbent ﬁrm A has a long purse. In particular, the sole owner-manager of
ﬁrm A has suﬃcient personal wealth to fund any investments he may want his ﬁrm to undertake.1
Firm A is currently unlevered. At time t−1, ﬁrm A has the ability to engage in an observable
leveraged recapitalization. In the contemplated recapitalization, the proceeds from a debt ﬂotation
would be distributed as a dividend.2 Following Hart (1991) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992), ﬁrm A
issues debt that is not renegotiable. Conﬁning attention to non-renegotiable debt is without loss of
generality, since only non-renegotiable debt has commitment value for the incumbent.
In reality, public debt issued to dispersed creditors best approximates the type of security we
have in mind. As argued by Smith and Warner (1979), the strictures of the Trust Indenture Act
1Equivalently, we may assume A enjoys frictionless acess to external equity.
2In fact, the ﬁrm with debt would optimally pay out any earnings and cash as dividends. There is no precautionary
motive for retentions since the owner-manager has a long purse.
5( T I A )m a k ei td i ﬃcult to renegotiate public debt. In particular, TIA requires bondholder unanimity
in order to change any core term of an indenture. Aside from coordination issues, the unanimity
requirement in TIA encourages lenders to free-ride, making renegotiation more diﬃcult. Consistent
with these arguments, Gilson, John and Lang (1990) and Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994)
ﬁnd that public debt is the single best predictor of failed private workouts. Thus, our model provides
a rationale for the observed use of public debt which is distinct from theories invoking managerial
agency problems, e.g. Hart (1991).
In the next period (t0), a single potential entrant ﬁrm, run by a penniless manager M1, decides
whether to enter the market after observing ﬁrm A’s ﬁnancing decision. Thus, ﬁrm A is a Stackelberg
leader in ﬁnancial structure. The potential entrant is labeled ﬁrm B.
In the interest of clarity, the proﬁtability assumptions mirror those in Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990). The discount rate is zero and all agents are risk neutral. There are two periods of potential
product market competition, t1 and t2. Throughout, capital letters denote the incumbent and
lowercase letters the entrant. If there is no competitor in the market in period t1,t h ei n c u m b e n t
earns a random monopoly proﬁt Πm
1 . If there is a competitor in the market in t1 the incumbent earns
a random duopoly proﬁt Πd









































Figure 1: Time Line in Baseline Model
In period t2, the incumbent earns Πm
2 if there is no competitor and Πd
2 if there is a competitor.
Second-stage proﬁts are drawn from [ΠL,ΠH] with ΠL > 0 and the same support under duopoly and
6monopoly. If the incumbent enjoys a monopoly in the second-stage, proﬁts Πm
2 have p.d.f. g and
c.d.f. G. If the incumbent faces competition in the second-stage, proﬁts Πd
2 have p.d.f. h and c.d.f.
H. There are no atoms in the distributions G and H of second-stage proﬁts and monopoly proﬁts





denote the expected monopoly rent in period tj.
Since ﬁrm B is the only potential entrant, the incumbent will enjoy a monopoly in both periods
if M1 does not enter at time t0.I f M1 does enter, there will be product market competition in
period t1 and potentially in period t2. If entry occurs, the incumbent can still eliminate competition
in period t2 by acquiring the nonhuman assets of the entrant at time t−
2 . In the baseline model, the
incumbent has no other means of eliminating a successful entrant in period t2. Section 4 extends the
baseline model, allowing the incumbent to engage in predatory advertising that has the potential
to eliminate a successful entrant from continuing operations in period t2.
The working assumption in the model is that only the nonhuman assets (e.g. physical capi-
tal, brand name, or patents) of ﬁrm B are essential for independent production in period t2. For
example, the physical capital of an entrant is essential if there is time-to-build or if the capital
occupies a central location (e.g. downtown storefront). The brand name of the entrant is necessary
if reputation-building operates with a lag. The essential nature of patents is obvious. In contrast,
the original manager M1 is only needed to get the project up and running. That is, M1 is essential
for period t1 but not for period t2. This assumption ensures the entrant’s assets have value even
if manager M1 no longer operates them. The economic motivation for the assumption is that a
company’s founder may have a good idea facilitating entry. However, once the ﬁrm matures, there
is greater substitutability of managers. This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence pre-
sented by Hannan, Burton and Baron (1996) in a study of Silicon Valley start-ups. They document
that the probability of a nonfounder CEO is 10% in the ﬁrst 20 months, 40% after 40 months, and
80% after 80 months.
Entry requires a single investment i. At time t0, the cost i is drawn from [0,¯ ı] with p.d.f. z(·)
7and c.d.f. Z(·). The distribution of entry costs has no atoms and satisﬁes z(i) > 0 for all i ∈ [0,¯ ı].
At time t−1, when the incumbent makes his leverage decision, he does not know the realized value
of i. Rather, he simply knows the distribution of entry costs. Entrant proﬁts in period t1 are π,w i t h
π distributed continuously on [πL,πH],w h e r eπL ≥ 0, following a strictly positive and atomless
probability density function f. In period t2, if manager M1 operates the assets on her own, she
earns a privately observed beneﬁto fy which encompasses expected proﬁts and private beneﬁts
of control. We follow Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) in assuming the entry investment always has
positive expected net present value with
A1:¯ π + y ≥ ¯ ı.
Under assumption A1, manager M1 would always enter the market if she could ﬁnance entry out
of her own funds.
Since M1 has no wealth, she must turn to an outside ﬁnancier. Limiting her ability to raise funds
is the fact that realized proﬁts are her private information. Therefore, rewards and punishments of
M1 can only be made contingent upon her voluntary proﬁtr e p o r t .T h eﬁnancial contract between
the ﬁnancier and manager is written at time t0 when the entry cost i is observed. The framework for
ﬁnancial contracting between M1 and the ﬁnancier follows those presented in Faure-Grimaud (2000)
and Povel and Raith (2004). The space of legally enforceable contracts consists of a reimbursement
schedule r that M1 pays to the ﬁnancier from the t1-proﬁt and a reward probability b. The reward
b is the probability of M1 winning ownership of the ﬁrm at time t+
1 in an “ownership lottery.”
The set of contracts is not limited to deterministic schemes: the fact that the reward for M1
is stochastic reﬂects the fact that, at a theoretical level, deterministic schemes are dominated.
Further, randomization has an interesting economic interpretation, in that it approximates the type
of deviations from absolute priority that are routinely observed in bankruptcies.
Our model of the contracting problem for the entrant diﬀers in two respects from Faure-Grimaud
(2000) and Povel and Raith (2004). First, the exit payoﬀs are endogenous and depend upon the
ﬁnancial structure of the incumbent. Second, we follow Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) in assuming
8the ﬁnancier holds all bargaining power at time t0. This is without loss of generality since we are
interested in identifying conditions under which M1 will be able to raise the necessary funds. The
maximum funding possible is that which obtains when the ﬁnancier has all bargaining power.
The conjunction of privately observed cash ﬂows and the entrant’s need for outside ﬁnance
are both integral to our analysis. To see this, recall that entry would always take place under
assumption A1 if the entrant could self-ﬁnance or credibly deliver all project returns to the ﬁnancier.
Anticipating, the incumbent chooses his ﬁnancial posture to take advantage of the entrant’s need
for outside ﬁnance.
1.2. Secondary Asset Markets and the Incumbent’s Financial Structure
Just prior to the second period of poten t i a lp r o d u c tm a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o n( t−
2 ), the entrant’s
assets can be sold to three potential bidders: ﬁrm A, manager 2 (M2)3, and a liquidation specialist.
Following Shleifer and Vishny (1992), we assume the ﬁnancier cannot operate the assets himself.
If he wins the ownership lottery, he must sell the assets using an ascending-bid auction. In this
auction, the behavior of the bidder with the highest fundamental value (the incumbent) has a direct
impact since prices are higher when he bids. Other standard auction formats lead to comparable
predictions. Let p denote the value the ﬁnancier attaches to ownership rights, evaluated at the time
the ﬁnancial contract is signed (t0). In the baseline model, which rules out predation, p is equal to
the price fetched for the assets if the ﬁnancier conducts an auction.
The liquidation specialist values the assets at  >0. Manager M2 values the assets at αy,w h i c h
can be viewed as the sum of expected proﬁts plus private beneﬁts of control. In the interest of
generality, the baseline model considers the possibility that M1 values the assets more highly than
M2 (α<1)a sw e l la st h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tM2 values the assets more highly than M1 (α ≥ 1).
An unlevered incumbent values the assets at the monopoly rent ∆Π2. All valuations are public






2 >ymax{α,1} ≥ ymin{α,1} > >0.
A3:πH ≤  .
Assumption A2 states that industry proﬁts are highest in period t2 when the incumbent main-
tains a monopoly. Further, the value to M1 and M2 of running ﬁrm B in period t2 exceeds the
liquidation value. Assumption A3 implies that M1 is ﬁnancially constrained at time t−
2 . In partic-
ular, M1 does not have suﬃcient wealth to buy back the assets of the ﬁrm on secondary markets
if the ﬁnancier seizes them.4 Intuitively, the proﬁts generated by a start-up are likely to be low
relative to the value of underlying assets. Assumption A3 is also useful from a technical perspective
ensuring there are no feedback eﬀects from M1’s compensation to asset prices.
If the ﬁnancier seizes the ﬁrm’s assets, which depends on the outcome of the ownership lottery, the
sales price depends upon A’s ﬁnancial structure. This is because debt overhang aﬀects willingness-
to-pay. In particular, if the incumbent issues risky debt, lenders capture some of the gain from
an acquisition since the shift from duopoly to monopoly reduces the probability of default. This
leakage of surplus from an acquisition reduces levered equity’s willingness-to-pay. Anticipating, in
our baseline model attention can be conﬁned to two ﬁnancial strategies of the incumbent: deep
pockets and shallow pockets. Under the deep pockets strategy, the incumbent remains unlevered
and faces no debt overhang. Under the shallow pockets strategy, the incumbent uses the debt
overhang created by a long-term public debt obligation in order to pre-commit to a maximum bid
of  .5 This ensures the incumbent has no eﬀect on the price of assets in secondary markets.
Under the stated assumptions, if entry occurs, an acquisition at time t−
2 is always a positive
NPV investment to unlevered equity. It follows that if the ﬁnancier conducts an asset auction, the
unlevered incumbent will be the highest bidder and will acquire the assets for αy. The NPV of this
acquisition is ∆Π2 − αy > 0.
4Note also that M1 cannot gain the backing of another ﬁnancier since y is nonveriﬁable in a court.
5Short-term debt coming due in period t1 would have no eﬀect since it matures before the acquisition decision. See
Myers (1977) for a discussion.
10Long-term debt is due at the end of period t2 and its face value is denoted D. In order to protect
lenders against dilution, the debt covenant prohibits the ﬂotation of any additional debt. Smith
and Warner (1979) document that the issuance of additional debt is commonly restricted by debt
covenants.
The function β measures levered equity’s maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) for entrant assets.




(Π − D)[g(Π) − h(Π)]dΠ. (1)
If the debt obligation is safe, the incumbent’s willingness-to-pay remains equal to the full monopoly
rent, with
D ∈ [0,ΠL] ⇒ β(D)=∆Π
m
2 . (2)
Further, we know that β(ΠH)=0 . From Leibniz’ rule and the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
relation between G and H it follows that β is strictly decreasing on (ΠL,ΠH). Thus, there exists a
unique debt commitment, call it D( ), solving
β[D( )] =   ⇒ D( )=β−1( ). (3)
The incumbent can commit to a maximum bid of   using any long-term debt commitment with
D ≥ β−1( ).
If the incumbent has shallow pockets, the ﬁnancier recognizes that asset prices will be depressed,
since the incumbent will not participate in the asset auction. In this case, if the ﬁnancier were to
hold an asset auction, M2 would win and pay  . Recall that under the deep pockets strategy, the
ﬁnancier anticipates a higher auction price of αy >  . These prices and outcomes are summarized
in the last two columns of Table 1.
We denote by x the value M1 attaches to ownership rights, evaluated at the time the ﬁnancial
contract is signed (t0).R e c a l lt h a ti fM1 continues with independent production in t2,h e rb e n e ﬁti s
y. Instead of running the ﬁrm herself, M1 can hold an asset auction (like the ﬁnancier) or conduct
a direct negotiated trade sale. To maintain consistency with the valuations obtained under the
11ascending auction, it is assumed that the buyer holds all bargaining power in the event of a trade
sale. In this way, M1 is always paid the value of her next best alternative regardless of the mode of
asset sale.
Manager M1 retains ownership Financier seizes assets
Value x Owner in t2 Value p Owner in t2
Shallow: α<1 y M1   M2
Shallow: α ≥ 1 y M2   M2
Deep: α<1 y A αy A
Deep: α ≥ 1 αy A αy A
Table 1: Asset Valuations and Final Owners
Suppose that M1 has won the ownership lottery and ﬁrst consider outcomes if A has deep
pockets. In an auction, the assets would be sold to A at price αy. Independent production pays y,
as does a direct trade sale. In this setting, if α ≥ 1 then x = αy with M1 opting to auction the
assets to A.I fα<1, then x = y,w i t hM1 selling assets to ﬁrm A in a direct trade sale.
Suppose next that the incumbent has shallow pockets. If A does not participate, the auction
price of the assets would be  . We can therefore rule out M1 choosing the asset auction since
independent production yields y>  .Consider next a direct trade sale to M2.I fα ≥ 1, M2 would
buy the assets in the trade sale with M1 receiving x = y. If M2 is less productive, with α<1,
then M1 would run the ﬁrm herself and receive the beneﬁt x = y. These prices and outcomes are
summarized in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 1.
T h e r ea r eaf e wp o i n t sw o r t h yo fn o t ei nT a b l e1 .F i r s t ,n o t et h a tﬁrm A will only face product
market competition at t2 if it chooses shallow pockets. This is the strategic cost to the shallow
pockets strategy. The strategic beneﬁt to shallow pockets is that it can be expected to lower the
ﬁnancier’s return. As shown in Table 1, the ﬁnancier can anticipate higher auction prices if the
incumbent has deep pockets. In addition, note that the value the manager attaches to ownership
12(x) is weakly higher when the incumbent has deep pockets. Anticipating, this eﬀect also raises the
ﬁnancier’s return. This is because the manager is willing to deliver more ﬁrst-stage cash to the
ﬁnancier in exchange for an increase in b.
It is also worth noting that asset seizure by the ﬁnancier is generally pareto ineﬃcient, from the
perspective of M1 and the ﬁnancier. Asset seizure is pareto ineﬃcient when p<x ,which is the case
in the ﬁrst three scenarios in Table 1. In these scenarios, p<xstems from the fact that M1 has
the ability to run the ﬁrm herself, receiving y as a payoﬀ. The weakly higher reservation value of
manager M1 causes the assets to have weakly higher value when she has ownership rights. However,
asset seizure by the ﬁnancier is not necessarily pareto ineﬃcient. If ﬁrm A has deep pockets and
α ≥ 1, then p = x and the assets are equally valuable to the ﬁnancier and M1. Regardless of who
wins the ownership lottery in this case, an auction would be conducted with M2 serving as the
price-setter.
2. The Entrant Contract
2.1. Optimal Contracting
In both the baseline model and extended model (which allows for predation), the optimal entrant
contract depends upon the value of ownership rights to the ﬁnancier (p) and the original manager
(x) evaluated at the time the two parties write the contract (t0). The optimal contract maximizes
the ﬁnancier’s gross return, which consists of ﬁrst-stage cash ﬂows r and the value of his ownership
rights. Limited liability (LL) demands r(π) ≤ π at each point on the state-space [πL,πH]. From the
revelation principle it follows that attention can be conﬁned to contracts eliciting truthful reporting
of ﬁrst-stage proﬁts. The global incentive compatibility (IC) condition is
xb(π) − r(π) ≥ xb(e π) − r(e π) ∀ (π,e π). (4)
This condition is satisﬁed with equality at all points on the state space when r0 = xb0.
The IC condition is informative about the trade-oﬀsf a c i n gt h eﬁnancier in choosing b. By
increasing b marginally, the value of the ﬁnancier’s ownership rights falls by pb0. However, there is
13an indirect gain, since M1 is willing to increase the reimbursement by xb0. Therefore, the net gain is
(x−p)b0.W h e nx>pthere is a net beneﬁtt oi n c r e a s i n gb marginally. However, the LL constraint
limits r0 a n dw i t hi tb0.






[r(π)+( 1− b(π))p]f (π)dπ (5)
subject to
LL : r(π) ≤ π
IC : r0(π)=xb0(π)
b(π) ∈ [0,1].
We begin by rewriting the objective function in (5) using integration by parts:6
v = r(πH)+( 1− b(πH))p −
Z πH
πL
F (π)[r0(π) − pb0(π)]dπ. (6)









It follows that any contract satisfying the IC constraint achieves a value
v = r(πL)+p(1 − b(πL)) + (x − p)
Z πH
πL
[1 − F (π)]b0(π)dπ. (8)
Consider ﬁrst settings where x = p. Inspection of (8) reveals that here any contract respecting
the IC and LL constraints is optimal, provided that r(πL)=πL and b(πL)=0 . Such contracts
yield a return to the ﬁnancier of v = πL +p. Consider next the optimal contract when x>p .From
equation (8) it follows that it is optimal to set r(πL)=πL and b(πL)=0 .S t a r t i n ga tb(πL)=0 ,
an optimal contract maximizes b0. From the IC constraint we have b0(π)=r0(π)/x. In order to
6One can also solve the program using standard optimal control. The present method is perhaps more transparent.
14maximize b0 while respecting both the IC and LL constraints, an optimal contract sets r0 =1and
b0 =1 /x. This discussion establishes Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If the original manager attaches greater value to ownership rights than the ﬁnancier






If the original manager and ﬁnancier attach equal value to ownership rights (x = p), then there are
many payoﬀ-equivalent optimal contracts, including the contract (9) and a contract with b(π)=0
and r(π)=πL for all π. In all cases, the return to the ﬁnancier under the optimal contract is







When x>p ,the optimal entrant contract allocates all ﬁrst-stage proﬁtt ot h eﬁnancier. In
exchange for delivering the proﬁts, the ﬁnancier increases the probability that M1 will retain own-
ership. We recall that when x>p , asset seizure by the ﬁnancier is pareto ineﬃcient ex post, since
the assets are worth more to M1. However, asymmetric information between M1 and the ﬁnancier
precludes pareto-improving trade ex post. Therefore, the entrant contract is renegotiation-proof.
Demanding renegotiation-proofness of the entrant contract may be particularly important given
that start-ups tend to have better lines of communication with their ﬁnanciers than do large public
ﬁrms. See Faure-Grimaud (2000) for a related discussion.
Lemma 1 also tells us that incumbent ﬁnancial structure potentially inﬂuences optimal control
rights for the entrant. To see this, assume α>1 and consider the eﬀect of a shift in the incumbent’s
ﬁnancial posture from shallow to deep pockets. Such a shift increases the manager’s valuation of
ownership rights from x = y to x = αy. Under the contract in equation (9), such an increase in
x leads to decreases in b. Eﬀectively, the increase in x allows the ﬁnancier to maintain stronger
15ownership rights for himself while still extracting ﬁrst-stage proﬁts. In fact, in the setting just
considered, it can also be optimal to give the ﬁnancier all control rights (b =0 ) . This is because
the shift from shallow to deep pockets results in p = x. In this case, ﬁnancier ownership is pareto
eﬃcient and so there is no loss in giving him full ownership rights. The more general point is that
the model delivers the novel prediction that ﬁnanciers retain stronger ownership rights when facing
deep-pocketed incumbents.
2.2. Financier Returns: Baseline Model
Let v∗
s and v∗
d denote the ﬁnancier’s gross return under optimal contracts, according to whether
the incumbent has shallow or deep pockets, respectively. From equation (10) it follows that
v∗



























Condition (12) is intuitive. When α<1 the value obtained by the ﬁnancier is higher when the
incumbent has deep pockets. The value diﬀerential reﬂects the positive eﬀect that the deep-pocketed
incumbent has on the ﬁnancier’s payoﬀ in the asset auction.
A bit of algebra reveals that
α ≥ 1 ⇒ v∗
d − v∗






+( α − 1)(π − πL) > 0. (13)
Comparison of (13) and (12) reveals that when M2 has high a valuation, the gain to the ﬁnancier due
to the existence of a deep-pocketed incumbent is even higher. This is because stronger competition
in secondary asset markets leads to higher auction prices and enables the ﬁnancier to oﬀer less
generous ownership rights to M1.
16Conditions (12) and (13) illustrate clearly the strategic cost of deep pockets for the incumbent,
since the increase in the ﬁnancier’s payoﬀ increases the likelihood of entry. However, these costs
must be weighed against the strategic beneﬁt arising from deep pockets, namely the ex ante value
of precommitting to make an acquisition if entry occurs.
3. Optimal Financial Posture for Incumbent: Baseline Model
Having determined the optimal entrant contract, and the eﬀect of the incumbent’s ﬁnancial
condition on that contract, we can now turn to the optimal ﬁnancial posture of the incumbent. This
section focuses on the baseline model, which rules out predation. In this setting, the incumbent
has two lines of defense. The ﬁrst line of defense is entry-deterrence. The second line of defense is
acquisition of a successful entrant at time t−
2 , prior to second-stage product market competition.
Let (Vd,V s) denote the value at time t−1 of the claim held by the incumbent according to whether
he adopts deep or shallow pockets. The appendix shows that in the baseline model one may conﬁne
attention to these two ﬁnancial postures without loss of generality. The intuition is as follows.
Intermediate ﬁnancial postures are dominated since they either raise asset prices and/or prevent
the incumbent from making an acquisition. In other words, the incumbent only wants to participate
in asset auctions if he will acquire the entrant’s assets. Unsuccessful participation in the asset
auction only serves to drive up asset prices and encourage entry. We summarize this conclusion in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In the baseline model, the optimal incumbent ﬁnancial structure will induce a willingness-
to-pay for entrant assets that is either weakly less than   or strictly greater than max{αy,y}.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the incumbent adopts shallow pockets, entry occurs with probability Z(v∗
s). In the event of
entry, the incumbent does not acquire the competitor and he earns the duopoly proﬁti nb o t h
periods. If i>v ∗
s, entry is deterred and the incumbent earns the monopoly proﬁti nb o t hp e r i o d s .
17It follows that the value of the equity held by the incumbent under the shallow pockets strategy at
time t−1 is7











Suppose next that the incumbent has deep pockets. In this case, the probability of entry is Z(v∗
d).
If no entry occurs, the incumbent earns the monopoly proﬁti nb o t hp e r i o d s .I fe n t r yo c c u r s ,t h e
incumbent earns the duopoly proﬁta tt1. The deep-pocketed incumbent then eliminates competition
in the second period through an acquisition. Therefore, expected proﬁts at t2 are Π
m
2 . The cost of
the acquisition depends on whether the ﬁnancier or M1 has ownership rights.
Let ξ(α) denote the expected acquisition cost for the deep-pocketed incumbent. As shown in
Table 1, when α ≥ 1 the acquisition cost is αy regardless of how ownership is allocated between the
ﬁnancier and M1.I fα<1, the incumbent must pay αy if he acquires the assets from the ﬁnancier
and he must pay a higher price y if he acquires the assets from M1. A bit of algebra reveals the
expected cost of the acquisition to be:
α<1 ⇒ ξ(α)=y − (1 − α)[y − (π − πL)] <y (15)
α ≥ 1 ⇒ ξ(α)=αy.
It is worth noting that ξ(α) is increasing in α. Intuitively, the incumbent must pay a higher acqui-
sition premium the higher the valuation of the rival bidder (M2).
From this analysis it follows that the value of the equity held by the incumbent under the deep
pockets strategy at time t−1 is










2 − ξ]. (16)
Let γ ≡ Vs −Vd denote the gain to adopting shallow pockets rather than deep pockets. Shallow
p o c k e t si sc h o s e no n l yi fγ ≥ 0. We have
γ =[ Z(v∗
d) − Z(v∗
s)][∆Π1 + ∆Π2] − Z(v∗
d)[∆Π2 − ξ]. (17)
7In fact, the same valuation is achieved for all debt commitments with WTP ∈ [0, ].
18Equation (17) illustrates clearly the fundamental trade-oﬀ associated with choosing between deep
and shallow pockets. The ﬁrst term represents the value gained from the entry-deterrence provided
by shallow pockets, recalling v∗
d >v ∗
s. The second term represents the expected NPV from making
an acquisition in the event that entry occurs.
Diﬀerentiating γ allows us to determine factors that increase or decrease the attractiveness of










[∆Π1 + ξ] > 0. (18)
Thus, increases in α make shallow pockets more attractive. Recall that the advantage of deep pockets
is that the incumbent maintains his willingness to make the positive NPV acquisition, should entry
occur. When α is high, the incumbent must pay a high acquisition cost, reducing the NPV of an
acquisition. This eﬀect is captured by the ﬁrst term in equation (18). Since higher values of α result
in higher acquisition premia, they also raise ﬁnancier returns. This increases the likelihood of entry
and further reduces the attractiveness of deep pockets. This eﬀect is captured by the second term
in equation (18).
The shallow pockets strategy becomes less attractive as the liquidation value of assets increase,
since increases in liquidation values increase v∗
s and the likelihood of entry despite the adoption of








[∆Π1 + ∆Π2] < 0. (19)
It is easily veriﬁed that the shallow pockets strategy becomes more attractive when the ﬁrst-stage





s) > 0. (20)
Intuitively, the shallow pockets strategy increases the probability of entry-deterrence and monopoly
power in period t1. The larger the gain from the t1 monopoly, the more attractive is the shallow
pockets strategy.






The intuition is as follows. The shallow-pocketed ﬁrm only captures the monopoly rent in the second
period if entry does not take place. In contrast, the deep-pocketed incumbent always has monopoly
power in the second period. Thus, second period monopoly rents have a larger eﬀect on incumbent
ﬁrm value under deep pockets. Taken together, these results tell us that the shallow pockets strategy
is more attractive for value ﬁrms than for growth ﬁrms, since the former derive a greater portion of
their value from near-term proﬁts.
We summarize the results of the section in the following proposition.









The attractiveness of shallow pockets increases in short-term monopoly rents; increases in the as-
set valuation of the rival bidder; decreases in long-term monopoly rents; and decreases in asset
liquidation values.
4. Predation versus Acquisition
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) (BS below) show ﬁnancial slack can potentially be rationalized by
the motive to maintain predation capability. This section explores this line of reasoning in greater
detail. In order to do so within our model we cannot use the predation technology featured in the BS
model, however. In the BS model, the predation technology consists of the incumbent paying a cost
in order to increase the probability of low ﬁrst-stage proﬁts for the entrant. Their model assumes
the only punishment available to the ﬁnancier is a “liquidation” which removes the upstart from the
product market in the second period. However, we have argued that a ﬁnancier need not remove
assets from their highest value use in order to punish low proﬁt reports, and in fact cannot credibly
20commit to do so. Realistically, a ﬁnancier can and will simply seize assets and sell them at the
highest possible price. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), assets are typically redeployed in
the same industry because of their industry speciﬁcity. In addition, from the perspective of optimal
contracting, the higher sales price when assets are sold for maximum value, rather than liquidated,
improves the credibility of contract enforcement. Therefore, entrant assets are unlikely to migrate
outside the incumbent’s market in equilibrium. Our model of predation is designed to capture this
economic reality.
A second critical diﬀerence between the two models is in the set of strategic options that are
assumed to be available to the incumbent. In the BS model, the incumbent chooses between preda-
tion and accommodation. In our model, the incumbent also has the option to acquire the upstart.
This added option to acquire leads to radically diﬀerent conclusions about the relationship between
leverage and credible predation. In particular, we show that while an unlevered incumbent certainly
has the means to engage in predation, he will generally prefer to acquire competitors. However, by
taking on a suﬃcient amount of debt, the threat of predation can be made credible.
4.1. The Choice between Predation, Acquisition, and Do-Nothing
A time-line of events for the extended model with predation is provided in Figure 2. At time
t−
2 the incumbent has three mutually exclusive options: acquisition; predation; or do-nothing. The
cost of predation is φ ≥ 0. If successful, predation renders the assets of the entrant useless within
the industry during period t2. Successful predation gives the incumbent a monopoly in period t2
and reduces the market value of the entrant’s assets to their value out-of-industry, which is  .8
The probability of successful predation is θ ∈ (0,1). For example, if the entrant’s critical asset is its
brand name, the predation technology can be viewed as approximating negative advertising directed
against an upstart. If the entrant or incumbent holds a patent, then the predation technology can be
viewed as approximating lawsuits challenging the entrant for patent infringement. The assumption
that predation has an uncertain outcome follows the argument put forth by Telser (1966) and
8At this point, we assume that the market amongst asset liquidators is competitive and all value the assets at  .
21continued by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) that this is a necessary condition for predation to be
observed in equilibrium; otherwise the entrant would exit immediately when exposed to a credible
threat of predatory activities.
“Do-nothing” means that the incumbent will neither acquire the upstart nor engage in preda-
tion. If the incumbent opts for do-nothing, or if predation fails, then the assets will be operated
independently by either the current manager M1 or the rival M2, depending on the outcome of the
ownership lottery in t1. Within the set of ﬁnancial postures that induce do-nothing, it is clearly ex
ante optimal for the incumbent to choose a debt level suﬃciently high such that it does not push up
asset prices in secondary asset markets by making unsuccessful bids for entrant assets. Thus, any ex





































Figure 2: Time Line in Extended Model
For simplicity, the remainder of the paper assumes managers M1 and M2 are equally productive.
Speciﬁcally, we assume
A4:α =1 .
Assumption A4 is not essential for our conclusions, but serves to simplify the analysis. In particular,
A4 ensures that the price of acquiring the entrant is equal to y regardless of whether ownership rights
at time t+
1 are held by M1 or the ﬁnancier.
Consider now the ex post (t−
2 ) continuation payoﬀ to the incumbent under his three available
responses to entry: predation (P), acquisition (A)o rd o - n o t h i n g( N). These payoﬀs are denoted by
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(Π − D)h(Π)dΠ. (24)
Rearranging terms, one can rewrite the continuation payoﬀ to predation as
ΩP(D)=θΩA(D)+( 1− θ)ΩN(D)+θy − φ. (25)
We now turn to the question how the incumbent’s ﬁnancial structure inﬂuences his response to
entry. Figure 3 compactly summarizes the analysis. Formal proofs are presented in the appendix.
Consider ﬁrst the choice between acquisition and do-nothing. Rearranging terms, we see that
ΩA(D) − ΩN(D)=β(D) − y, (26)
where β is the willingness-to-pay function from Section 1. From the properties of the function β,
it is readily veriﬁed that there exists a unique debt level D1 ∈ (ΠL,D( )) such that the incumbent
will be just indiﬀerent between acquisition and do-nothing.
Consider adding predation to the picture. If the incumbent has debt D1,t h e nΩA(D1)=ΩN(D1).
If D = D1 and φ = θy, it follows from equation (25) that the incumbent is indiﬀerent between the
three responses to entry. This indiﬀerence point is labeled X in Figure 3. Equation (25) also shows
that predation is dominated by either acquisition or do-nothing for higher predation costs, φ>θ y .
Therefore, if φ>θ y , the only credible responses to entry are acquisition and do-nothing, with the
latter being chosen for all D>D 1.
Consider now the choice between predation and acquisition, assuming φ ≤ θy.I t i s r e a d i l y
veriﬁed that the relative attractiveness of predation increases with debt. To see this note that
D ∈ (ΠL,ΠH) ⇒ Ω0
P(D) − Ω0
A(D)=( 1− θ)[H(D) − G(D)] > 0. (27)
23The reason is that the distribution of proﬁts under acquisition is ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant
relative to those under predation. Thus, the value of levered equity under the acquisition strategy
is more sensitive to marginal increases in debt.
Not surprisingly, if φ is suﬃciently small, the incumbent prefers predation to acquisition regard-
less of his debt level. To see this note that,
D ≤ ΠL ⇒ ΩP(D) − ΩA(D)=y − (1 − θ)∆Π2 − φ. (28)
From (27) and (28) it follows that if φ<y−(1 − θ)∆Π2, predation is strictly preferred to acquisition
ex post for all D. For higher levels of predation costs, one can determine a debt level such that the
incumbent is just indiﬀerent between predation and acquisition. This is the increasing schedule D2
in Figure 3. The positive slope of D2 is explained by the fact that, if φ is increased, indiﬀerence
between predation and acquisition can only be maintained if there is a compensating increase in D.
Finally, consider the choice between predation and do-nothing. There is a debt schedule such
that the incumbent is just indiﬀerent between the two. This function is labeled D3.O n e p o i n t
on the schedule is the pair (φ,D)=( 0 ,ΠH). To determine the slope, note that marginal increases
in debt increase the relative attractiveness of do-nothing. Intuitively, predation oﬀers ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominant proﬁts relative to do-nothing, so levered equity value under predation is more
sensitive to marginal increases in debt. Therefore, as φ is increased, indiﬀerence between predation
and do-nothing is maintained only if there is a compensating decrease in D.
We summarize the formal results (illustrated in Figure 3) as follows.
Proposition 2. The incumbent response to entry depends on D and φ. (i) If φ>θ y ,then D ≤ D1
induces acquisition and D>D 1 induces do-nothing. (ii) If φ<y− (1 − θ)∆Π2 then for all
D ≤ D3(φ) the incumbent chooses predation and for all D>D 3(φ) the incumbent chooses do-
nothing. (iii) If φ ∈ [y−(1 − θ)∆Π2,θy],t h e nD<D 2(φ) induces acquisition; D ∈ [D2(φ),D 3(φ)]
induces predation; and D>D 3(φ) induces do-nothing.
Proof: See Appendix.
244.2. Predation and Financier Returns
To facilitate comparison with the baseline model, ﬁnancier returns are denoted v∗∗ in the ex-
tended model that allows for predation. It was shown in Proposition 2 that the incumbent’s reaction
to entry is determined by the debt D it chooses at date t−1 and the cost of predation φ.W en o w
analyze the impact of the incumbent’s choice between acquisition, predation and do-nothing on the
ﬁnancier return.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which (φ,D) are such that the incumbent will choose do-nothing in
response to entry, recalling that, within this set, it will always be optimal to choose D ≥ D( ) in
order to prevent a positive feedback eﬀect on equilibrium asset prices. In this case, if the ﬁnancier
seizes the assets, his only option is to sell to M2 for a price of p =  .I fM1 retains ownership then
she obtains a beneﬁt x = y by continuing to run the ﬁrm herself in t2.F r o mL e m m a1 ,t h eﬁnancier
obtains
v∗∗







Next, suppose (φ,D) are such that the incumbent chooses predation in response to entry. An-
ticipating predation, M1 lowers her ex ante valuation of ownership rights to x = θ +(1− θ)y.T h e
ﬁnancier values ownership rights at p =  . Applying Lemma 1, we ﬁnd
v∗∗









N . This is quite intuitive. Under the optimal contract, M1 delivers all ﬁrst-stage
proﬁts to the ﬁnancier in exchange for control rights. However, anticipated predation causes M1 to
place a lower value on control rights. This reduces her incentive to deliver ﬁrst-stage proﬁts to the
ﬁnancier, ceteris paribus. In order for the ﬁnancier to compel delivery of ﬁrst-stage proﬁts, he must
cede greater control rights to M1. Thus, the wedge between v∗∗
N and v∗∗
P is explained entirely by the
weaker control rights retained by the ﬁnancier.
Finally, consider the case in which (φ,D) are such that the incumbent responds to entry by
making an acquisition. The equilibrium auction price is y since the incumbent participates in the
25auction. Manager M1 also attaches value y to ownership rights. Thus, we have p = x = y.T h e
ﬁnancier return is
v∗∗
A = πL + y. (31)
We note that v∗∗
N in expression (29) is strictly less than v∗∗






Entry is most likely if the incumbent will respond to entry with an acquisition and least attractive
if the incumbent will respond to entry with predation.
4.3 Predation and Optimal Incumbent Financial Posture
We now move back in time to the incumbent’s choice of ﬁnancial structure at time t−1.T h e
value of the claim held by the incumbent ex ante (at time t−1) hinges upon his equilibrium response
to entry. Incumbent ﬁrm value in the three regions in which predation (P), acquisition (A)o r
do-nothing (N) are the optimal reactions to entry, are respectively:
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We begin by making bilateral comparisons between the three incumbent reactions that are induced
by his initial leverage choice. The optimal long-term debt commitment is denoted D∗. If φ>θ y ,t h e
choice is between acquisition and do-nothing since predation is herein dominated ex post. Comparing








⇔ ˜ VN ≥ ˜ VA. (36)
If this condition holds and do-nothing is preferred, then D∗ ≥ D( ) >D 1 in order to maximize
the entry-deterrence eﬀect. Condition (36) is identical to the ratio test (21) in the baseline model,
stated in Proposition 1. This is intuitive. When φ is suﬃciently high, predation becomes irrelevant
26and we return to the choice between ﬁnancial structures inducing either acquisition or do-nothing.
Alternatively, we can write the condition under which the commitment to do-nothing is optimal as:












Intuitively, the condition above states that the commitment to do-nothing will be optimal when the
value of entry deterrence exceeds the loss in NPV from the acquisition.
Consider next the opposite extreme, where predation costs are extremely small in the sense
that φ<y− (1 − θ)∆Π2. From Proposition 2 we know the incumbent must choose (ex ante)
between ﬁnancial structures inducing either predation or do-nothing, since acquisition is dominated
b yp r e d a t i o ne xp o s t .I ti sr e a d i l yv e r i ﬁed that ex ante the commitment to predation dominates the
commitment to do-nothing since
˜ VP − ˜ VN =[ Z(v∗∗











Intuitively, do-nothing is dominated by predation from an ex ante perspective since the commitment
to predate reduces the probability of entry and also gives the incumbent a positive-NPV investment
in predation ex post. Both eﬀects are clearly illustrated in equation (38).
We are left with the intermediate region φ ∈ [y − (1 − θ)∆Π2,θy].F o rt h i sr a n g eo fφ values,
equation (38) once again establishes that predation dominates do-nothing from an ex ante perspec-
tive. Thus, we need only compare the ex ante payoﬀ induced by precommitment to predation versus
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¢ ⇔ ˜ VP ≥ ˜ VA. (39)
We may rewrite this condition in an intuitive form as:

















The left side of the inequality stated in equation (40) measures the diﬀerence in the NPV coming from
acquisition and that from predation. The right side of the inequality measures the entry deterrence
27beneﬁt coming from the commitment to predate. In particular, the commitment to predate has a
pushing eﬀect while the commitment to acquire has a pulling eﬀect. If this entry-deterrence eﬀect
is suﬃciently large, ﬁnancial structures inducing predation ex post are dominant from an ex ante
perspective.
We summarize the analysis of the incumbent’s optimal debt level with the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (i) For large predation costs φ>θ y ,if condition (36) is satisﬁed then D∗ ∈
[D( ),ΠH] and D∗ ≤ D1 if not. (ii) For intermediate predation costs φ ∈ [y − (1 − θ)∆Π2,θy],i f
condition (39) is satisﬁed then D∗ ∈ [D2(φ),D 3(φ)] and D∗ <D 2(φ) if not. (iii) For low predation
costs φ<y− (1 − θ)∆Π2, D∗ ≤ D3(φ).
Perhaps the scenario of intermediate predation costs described in part (ii) of Proposition 3 most
clearly illustrates the trade-oﬀs in the incumbent’s capital structure choice. As shown in Figure 3,
the incumbent can precommit to acquisition, predation, or do-nothing by choosing an appropriate
level of debt. When condition (39) is satisﬁed, the incumbent would like to precommit to predation.
This entails a balancing act. By issuing a suﬃcient amount of debt, the incumbent can credibly
convey a preference for predation over the safety of an acquisition. However, if the debt level is too
large, the debt overhang eﬀect causes the incumbent to forego all investments ex post. Thus, the
pledge to engage in predation is only credible when the ﬁrm chooses intermediate debt levels.
Proposition 3 shows that adding the predation option to the baseline model actually increases
the attractiveness of shallow pockets, contrary to the traditional “long purse” argument. Formally,
by comparing the ratio test in equation (21) of the baseline model with the corresponding ratio test
(39) in the extended model with predation, it is readily veriﬁed that the latter is weaker. Thus, the
availability of predation makes it more likely that shallow pockets are adopted in all cases except
if predation costs are very high and have no impact (φ>θ y ). Two factors explain this potentially
surprising result. First, since predation lowers expected asset values, the entry-deterrence beneﬁt
from shallow pockets is magniﬁed. Second, the ability to engage in predation lowers the downside
risk associated with a leveraged ﬁnancial structure, since predation represents a second line of defense
28should the attempt at entry deterrence fail.
5. Predation Preceding Acquisition
Section 4 considered a setting where the incumbent faced a mutually exclusive choice between
p r e d a t i o na n da c q u i s i t i o ni nr e s p o n s et oe n t r y .I nr eality, the sequencing of various decisions varies
across sectors. This section considers how results change with timing assumptions. We show that the
main causal mechanism in our paper is robust. In particular, it is shown that the entry-deterrence
beneﬁt of shallow pockets remains valid even if we include an additional option value of deep pockets,
by allowing the incumbent to absorb the entrant in an acquisition if predation fails.
We return to the setup of Section 4, but now assume that at time t−
2 the incumbent makes two
sequential decisions. The incumbent ﬁrst has the ability to engage in predation and observe whether
it is successful. If the incumbent fails to predate or engaged in failed predation, he is then free to
make an acquisition. That is, the incumbent can ﬁrst engage in predation, and still participate in
the acquisition market for the assets.
5.1. Analysis of Sequential Decisions
In order to assess optimal incumbent ﬁnancial posture at t−1, we must determine how leverage
aﬀects his response to entry. Figure 4 provides a compact summary. Working back in time, we
begin at the acquisition decision node. At this node, the incumbent’s continuation value is ΩA if he
acquires and ΩN if not. The analysis in Section 4 shows that the incumbent will acquire if and only
if D ≤ D1.
We consider ﬁrst the predation decision and ex ante payoﬀs for incumbents with D ≤ D1.A t
the predation decision node, anticipating that the following decision will be an acquisition, the
incumbent achieves a continuation value of ΩPA = ΩA + θy − φ if he engages in predation and ΩA
if not. The subscript PA denotes the scenario of predation followed by acquisition that is now a
fourth possible outcome besides acquisition (A), predation (P) and do-nothing (N). It follows that
if D ≤ D1 and φ>θ y ,the incumbent responds to entry by making an acquisition. If D ≤ D1
29and φ ≤ θy, the incumbent initially responds to entry with predation and makes an acquisition if
predation fails.
If the incumbent responds to entry by making an acquisition, his ex ante payoﬀ remains equal
to ˜ VA as computed in Section 4. We shall use ˜ VPA and v∗∗
PA to denote incumbent and ﬁnancier
payoﬀs, respectively, in the new scenario in which the incumbent responds to entry with predation-
acquisition sequentially. In this case, M1 and the ﬁnancier both value ownership rights (ex ante) at
x = p = θ +( 1− θ)y. It follows from Lemma 1 that
v∗∗
PA = πL + θ +( 1− θ)y. (41)
The incumbent’s ex ante payoﬀ can here be computed as
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2 − y) − φ]. (42)
Consider next the predation decision and ex ante payoﬀsf o rﬁrms with D>D 1. At the predation
decision node, the incumbent attains a continuation value of ΩP if he engages in predation and ΩN
if not. For φ ∈ [0,θy] we again deﬁne a schedule D3(φ) such that ΩP[D3(φ)] = ΩN[D3(φ)]. For
D>max(D1,D 3), the incumbent neither engages in predation nor makes acquisitions. Within the
set of debt levels inducing do-nothing, it is clearly ex ante optimal to choose D ≥ D( ), in order
to avoid exerting upward pressure on auction values. For D ≥ D( ), the incumbent receives an ex
ante payoﬀ equal to ˜ VN as computed in Section 4.
This leaves us with one case to consider. If φ ∈ [0,θy], all D ∈ (D1,D 3(φ)] induce predation
followed by no-acquisition should the predation fail. Before preceding with a comparison of debt
levels in this set, it is useful to identify the critical value of the predation costs, call it b φ, such that
D3(b φ)=D( ). This is readily computed using
ΩP[D3(φ)] ≡ ΩN[D3(φ)] ∀φ ∈ [0,θy]
⇒ φ = θβ[D3(φ)] ∀φ ∈ [0,θy]
⇒ b φ = θβ[D3(b φ)] = θβ[D( )] = θ . (43)
30Within the set of debt levels inducing predation, it is ex ante optimal to minimize upward pressure on
asset auction values, since this minimizes entry probability. If φ ≤ θ , the incumbent can implement
predation and avoid putting any upward pressure on auction prices by choosing D ∈ [D( ),D 3(φ)].
In such cases, x = θ  +( 1− θ)y, p =  , and the incumbent’s ex ante payoﬀ remains equal to ˜ VP as
computed in Section 4.
If φ ∈ (θ ,θy], all debt levels inducing predation necessarily induce upward pressure on auction
prices. Within this set, it is optimal ex ante to choose the highest debt level D = D3(φ),s i n c e
this minimizes feedback eﬀects on auction prices. Under this policy we have x = θ  +( 1− θ)y and
p = θ +(1−θ)β[D3(φ)] >  .For this case, we denote the resulting ex ante payoﬀ for the incumbent
and ﬁnancier by b VP and b vP, respectively. Applying Lemma 1, we ﬁnd
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The incumbent’s return is:
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It is readily veriﬁed that
v∗∗
PA > b vP >v ∗∗
P . (46)
Intuitively, the incumbent will trigger a run-up in auction prices to y if he makes acquisitions, and
to β(D3(φ)) ∈ ( ,y) if he commits to predation facing φ ∈ (θ ,θy]. Finally, auction prices remain
equal to   when the incumbent commits to predation facing φ ≤ θ .
5.2 Optimal Incumbent Financial Posture When Predation Precedes Acquisition
Having computed all feasible ex ante payoﬀs, we can now determine the incumbent’s optimal
ﬁnancial structure at t−1. If predation costs are high, with φ>θ y , the only credible policies ex post
are do-nothing and acquisition. The optimal decision is then determined by criterion (37). Once
again, the optimal ﬁnancial posture depends upon the relative magnitude of the entry deterrence
beneﬁt from shallow pockets relative to the NPV from acquisition investments. When the former is
larger, the optimal debt is D ∈ (D( ),ΠH]. When the latter is larger, the optimal debt is D ≤ D1.
31If predation costs are low (φ ≤ θ )t h eﬁrm can implement three policies ex post, with maximal
ex ante payoﬀs in parentheses: predation followed by acquisition (˜ VPA); predation with no auction
price pressure (˜ VP); and do-nothing (˜ VN). From equation (38) it follows that debt levels inducing
do-nothing are dominated ex ante by those inducing predation. Thus, we need only compare the
ex ante payoﬀs induced by predation and predation-acquisition. Rearranging terms, one obtains an
intuitive condition for the dominance of the shallow-pocketed strategy:























The left side of inequality (47) measures the diﬀerence in NPVs coming from investments in
response to entry. The deep-pocketed ﬁrm undertakes two positive NPV investments in response to
entry: predation and acquisition. The shallow-pocketed ﬁrm passes up the positive NPV acquisition
investment. The right side captures the corresponding entry deterrence beneﬁta r i s i n gf r o mt h e
precommitment to forego acquisition.
For intermediate values of predation costs, φ ∈ (θ ,θy],t h eﬁrm can again implement three
policies ex post, with maximal ex ante payoﬀs in parentheses: predation followed by acquisition
(˜ VPA); predation with auction price pressure (b VP); and do-nothing (˜ VN). The comparison between
strategies inducing do-nothing and those inducing predation is now more involved since the domi-
nance relation of (38) is no longer necessarily true. A suﬃcient condition for satisfaction of condition
(38) is that b vP ≤ v∗∗
N . However, the relationship between b vP and v∗∗
N is ambiguous. That is, in the
present case it is unclear whether the predation stance is superior to do-nothing in terms of entry
deterrence. On one hand, credible predation reduces ﬁnancier returns. However, stances inducing
credible predation are here associated with upward pressure on auction prices and ﬁnancier returns.
On a right-neighborhood for φ about θ , b vP ≤ v∗∗
N necessarily holds and b VP > ˜ VN. We next observe
that b VP − ˜ VN declines monotonically in φ on the interval φ ∈ (θ ,θy]. In this interval, b VP > ˜ VN if
b VP − ˜ VN =[ Z(v∗∗








> 0 . (48)
32If condition (48) holds, we need only compare the ex ante payoﬀs induced by predation and
predation-acquisition. Rearranging terms, one obtains a condition analogous to (47) for the domi-
nance of the shallow-pocketed strategy:




















We mention that a suﬃcient condition for b VP > ˜ VN o nt h ee n t i r ei n t e r v a li st h a tv∗∗
N ≥ b vP even
when the latter is evaluated at φ = θy. Comparing condition (29) to (44) this suﬃcient condition
can be stated as:
θ ≥ 1 −
¯ π − πL
y
. (50)
If condition (48) does not hold for some φ ∈ (θ ,θy], then the choice is only between do-nothing
and predation-acquisition over this range, and the latter is preferred if:
˜ VPA ≥ ˜ VN ⇔ Z(v∗∗
PA)][∆Π1 +( 1− θ)y + φ] ≥ Z(v∗∗
N )[∆Π1 + ∆Π2] . (51)
We summarize these results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. (i) For high predation costs (φ>θ y ) if condition (36) is satisﬁed then D∗ ∈
[D( ),ΠH] and D∗ ≤ D1 if not. (ii) For intermediate predation costs (φ ∈ (θ ,θy]), if conditions
(48) and (49) are satisﬁed then D∗ = D3(φ); if neither condition (48) nor (51) is satisﬁed then
D∗ >D 3(φ); and D∗ ≤ D1 in all other cases. (iii) If predation costs are low, with φ ≤ θ , then
D∗ ∈ [D( ),D 3(φ)] if condition (47) is satisﬁed and D∗ ≤ D1 if not.
The analysis of this section shows that, even with sequential decisions, the incumbent still faces
a fundamental trade-oﬀ between entry deterrence and ex post ﬂexibility. In particular, higher
debt levels serve to reduce asset prices, but also limit the incumbent’s incentive to make positive
NPV investments in response to entry. A comparison of Proposition 4 and Proposition 3 reveals
ambiguous eﬀects arising from the possibility of engaging in predation and acquisition sequentially.
33On one hand, comparing (47) and (49) to (40) shows that the parameter region over which the
incumbent opts for deep pockets increases when predation attempts precede acquisition. Intuitively,
the possibility of attempting predation prior to acquisition weakens the pulling eﬀect associated
with deep pockets. On the other hand, the incumbent will more frequently prefer stances inducing
do-nothing over those inducing predation, as condition (51) implies. Of course, a commitment to do-
nothing requires a very high debt level. Intuitively, if there is an active acquisition market following
predation attempts, the incumbent must concern himself with the inﬂuence he has on auction prices.
To minimize price impact, he must choose very high debt levels.
6. Empirical Implications
The main argument in this paper is that the leverage of an incumbent can discourage entry due
t ot h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect that shallow pockets have on exit (trade sale and liquidation) prices. In turn,
the decline in exit prices is predicted to exacerbate the ﬁnancing constraints faced by entrants. In
addition, we argued that in order for the shallow pockets strategy to be eﬀective, the incumbent
should rely upon public debt. Finally, we predict that the shallow pockets strategy is best suited
for value ﬁrms looking to protect short-term economic rents.
6.1 Tested Implications
We begin by discussing empirical evidence relating to the main elements of the causal mechanism
proposed in our paper. First, we note that the recent study by Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz
(2005) conﬁrms a positive relationship between exit prices and the debt capacity of entrants. In
particular, they ﬁnd that when a real estate development has greater redeployability (less restrictive
zoning regulations), the project supports larger loan balances and longer debt maturity.
Second, existing research supports the argument that ﬁnanciers can expect higher exit prices
when incumbents have deep pockets. Consider ﬁrst the evidence on recoveries in the event of business
failure. Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2006) ﬁnd that recovery ratios on defaulted debt are lower
in heavily levered industries. In addition, they document that the eﬀect is more pronounced for
34concentrated industries— highlighting the role of incumbent ﬁnancial structure. Empirical work on
ﬁresales shows that industry-wide distress appears to simultaneously reduce liquidation prices and
increase the odds of piecemeal liquidation or sales to buyers outside the industry (e.g. Pulvino,
1998; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2007).
Third, there appears to be a close connection between the terms of credit and the ﬁnancial
structure adopted by other ﬁrms. Newman and Rierson (2004) examine spillovers in European
telecom bond markets. They ﬁnd that a new bond ﬂotation by a given telecom ﬁrm generally has
a statistically and economically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the yield spread on the debt of other
borrowers. This is consistent with the causal mechanism in our model, which relies upon the notion
that incumbent debt has an adverse eﬀect on the ability of entrants to get ﬁnancing. It is worth
stressing that such a ﬁnding contradicts the notion that deep pockets deter entry.
An even more focused testable implication of our model is that deep-pocketed incumbents will
pay more for acquisitions than shallow-pocketed acquirers. In our model, deep-pocketed incumbents
always win bidding wars, but also drive up prices in the process. Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) ﬁnd
that bidder returns are negatively related to the cash ﬂow of the bidder, implying that acquirers
with high free cash ﬂow tend to pay more for targets. Schlingemann (2004) also documents the
same negative correlation between cash ﬂow and bidder gains, particularly for ﬁrms without growth
opportunities.
According to our theory, the acquisition strategy of ﬁrms depends on their market position and
their ﬁnancial structure. Our model predicts that deep-pocketed incumbents will more frequently
appear as buyers in acquisitions than their shallow-pocketed counterparts. There is indeed sub-
stantial evidence in support of this prediction. Hay and Liu (1998) ﬁnd that ﬁrms in industries
with dominant ﬁrms tend to rely more on external growth compared to internal growth, and that
this tendency is particularly pronounced among the dominant ﬁrms themselves. They report that
various measures of free cash ﬂow are signiﬁcant explanatory variables for the propensity of ﬁrms to
launch acquisitions. They ﬁnd this tendency to be particularly strong in ﬁrms that dominate their
35industry, as predicted by our model. Similarly, Harford (1999) documents that ﬁrms with large
cash reserves are more likely to make acquisitions and to increase acquisition spending. Kim (2003)
ﬁnds that mergers are more likely to occur in industries with high cash ﬂows. Andrade and Staﬀord
(2004) ﬁnd that within a given industry, acquirers will be the ﬁrms with high excess debt capacity
and large returns. Powell and Yawson (2005) ﬁnd that merger activity is positively related to free
cash ﬂow available in the industry.
Notably, the presence of deep-pocketed incumbents raises the acquisition expectation for rivals
and potential entrants, according to our model. There is evidence that the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility of
incumbents translates not only into more intensive merger activity in the industry, but also higher
expected gains in acquisitions for other ﬁrms. Akhigbe and Madura (1999) report that industry
rivals exhibit larger stock price increases after merger announcements if the ﬁrms in the industry
have large cash ﬂows.
The eﬀect of incumbent leverage on market entry in our model is more complex. A moderate
increase in leverage leads to less entry, as it reduces acquisition prices but maintains the attractivity
of predation, but a drastic increase of leverage will have the opposite eﬀect, by shifting the incumbent
response from predation to do-nothing. Campello (2006) presents evidence that appears to lend some
suppport to our predictions, by showing that moderate debt leads to a more competitive incumbent
policy whereas high levels of debt reduce competitiveness. The ﬁndings that ﬁrms adopting very
high leverage levels in LBOs or leveraged recaps (notably Chevalier, 1995b; Khanna and Tice, 2005)
are exposed to more entry are consistent with the second prediction.
Consider next the evidence on ﬁrms’ choice of debt levels and debt composition. Concerning
debt structure, Houston and James (1996) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006) document that
older ﬁrms have higher leverage ratios and are more likely to use public debt as opposed to bank or
privately placed debt. This is consistent with our argument that only public debt can be used as a
commitment device for ﬁrms seeking to protect economic rents. We here note that the free cash ﬂow
theory of Jensen (1986) also points to public debt as being preferable for a mature company seeking
36to constrain capital expenditures. As argued in the introduction, free cash ﬂow theory cannot
explain why an empire building CEO would saddle his ﬁrm with debt in the ﬁrst place. In contrast,
in our model the CEO takes on debt willingly. In this respect our theory complements Zwiebel
(1996), but Zwiebel predicts debt for possible takeover targets with poor investment opportunities,
whereas we predict leveraging for dominant ﬁrms that are potential acquirers, a prediction that is
easier to reconcile with the stylized fact that ﬁrm size is positively related to leverage (Rajan and
Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001).
Rajan and Zingales (1995) document that value ﬁrms choose higher debt levels than growth
ﬁrms. Such evidence is typically interpreted as being supportive of the theory of Myers (1977),
who argues that growth ﬁrms want to avoid debt. Our model generates a similar prediction, with
Proposition 1 stating that a leveraged posture is less attractive when the long-term monopoly rent is
important. However, Myers’ theory fails to explain why value ﬁrms take on debt. In his framework,
the optimal debt for all ﬁrms is zero. By way of contrast, our model provides a rationale for the
use of public debt by value ﬁrms, with Proposition 1 predicting that value ﬁrms will take on debt
in order to protect short-term rents.
Consistent with our theory, MacKay and Phillips (2005) ﬁnd that leverage ratios are higher in
concentrated industries. In addition, they ﬁnd that proﬁtability and (high) leverage for incumbent
ﬁrms are both highly persistent. This is consistent with our argument that the high debt burdens
of incumbents serve to alleviate the competitive pressures that would otherwise dissipate economic
rents.
6.2. Untested Implications
The model generates a number of implications that have not yet been tested. First, we predict
that the level of entrepreneurial (entry) activity in a sector or line-of-business should be positively
related to the ﬁnancial slack held by the incumbent. In fact, this prediction is based upon two
arguments. From the perspective of the potential entrant, the deep pockets of an incumbent serve
to encourage entry since exit prices are higher. From the perspective of the incumbent, the existence
37of a large number of entrepreneur-inventors will suggest that entry is always going to occur. If an
industry is buzzing with entrepreneurial activity, an incumbent will rationally conclude that some
entry will take place and that it is best to maintain the ability to make acquisitions ex post.9
Our model predicts incumbent leverage in situations in which it has an eﬀect on entry. Condi-
tions under which such situations arise are not clearly correlated with variables such as investment
opportunities, tangible assets or proﬁtability. One needs to account for industry structure and entry
risks before deriving predictions from our model. For example, an untested prediction following
from Proposition 1 is that incumbents should be more likely to adopt deep pockets when sunk costs
of entry are negligible, since the probability of entry is one regardless of their ﬁnancial structure.
When entry costs are low, attempts to deter entry are unlikely to succeed. In this case, the incum-
bent is better oﬀ maintaining a cash reserve to fund acquisitions. The opportunity to deter entry is
expected to vary considerably over the industry life cycle, with entry costs in very young industries
presumably too low for successful entry deterrence but rising to levels that make a shallow pockets
posture attractive as industries consolidate. A similar argument applies if ﬁnancial barriers to entry
are low, for example if entrants have large tangible asset values, or if their capital assets are easy to
redeploy in other sectors should entry fail. Entrants would then be expected to have high leverage
ratios, but since their assets have higher liquidation values, Proposition 1 predicts a low debt level
for the incumbent.
Another untested prediction of the model is that entrants’ ﬁnancial constraints are less severe
when industry incumbents maintain deep pockets; entrants should then be able to grow faster and
exhibit, on average, weaker indices for the presence of such constraints. Again, the study by Newman
and Rierson (2004) does oﬀer indirect evidence on this front, showing that costs of debt capital are
increasing in rival ﬁrms’ leverage.
A ﬁnal untested implication of our model is that expenditures on predatory activity, e.g. adver-
tising, should have an inverted U-shape in leverage. This is because unlevered ﬁrms prefer acquisition
9Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) examine the determinants of entrepreneurial spawning. However, they
do not use incumbent leverage as an explanatory variable.
38activity and heavily levered ﬁrms prefer passivity. According to our theory, intermediate leverage
oﬀers the most credible precommitment to predation.
7. Conclusion
There is no denying the value conferred upon an incumbent with deep pockets. In this paper,
we showed that maintaining deep pockets has a countervailing cost. When facing a deep-pocketed
incumbent, a potential entrant knows that the incumbent has both the resources and incentive to
buy the entrant’s assets in bankruptcy auctions or trade sales. In some cases, this positive eﬀect on
exit values may be suﬃcient to tilt the balance in favor of entry. In this paper, we illustrated the
existence of such an eﬀect using a simple contracting model with endogenous price determination
in secondary asset markets. The model highlights the trade-oﬀs associated with the choice between
deep and shallow pockets. Deep-pocketed incumbents retain the ﬁnancial slack needed to make
strategic acquisitions. However, this ﬁnancial posture causes them to indirectly subsidize their
future competitors.
The more general message to be taken away from this paper is that the overhang problem,
ﬁrst discussed by Myers (1977), is not isolated to the particular ﬁrm operating under a high debt
burden. Rather, the high debt of an incumbent will tend to discourage entry and entrepreneurial
activity in its sector. This is because the sell price of capital, typically treated as an exogenous
parameter in investment models, is an endogenous variable that is decreasing in the leverage of
existing ﬁrms. Our model shows that such overhang may confer a beneﬁt to incumbents, allowing
them to capture economic rents. However, such strategic behavior is clearly detrimental to product
market competition, economic eﬃciency and innovation.
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Lemma 3. I nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l ,t h eo p t i m a li n c u m b e n tﬁnancial structure entails debt commit-
ments such that willingness-to-pay is weakly less than   or strictly greater than ymax{α,1}.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst α<1. Let WTP denote the incumbent’s willingness-to-pay for the entrant as
of time t−
2 .T h eﬁrst two postures entered in Table A.1 indicate ownership and values under deep
and shallow pockets, respectively. The third listed posture yields a lower payoﬀ for A than shallow
pockets since it yields the same ownership structure (and hence proﬁt) in t2 but increases the value
of assets under ﬁnancier ownership and the likelihood of entry. The fourth listed posture yields a
lower payoﬀ for A than deep pockets since v∗ and the entry probability are the same, but A does
not make an acquisition if M1 wins the ownership lottery. The same reasoning indicates the last
listed posture also yields a lower payoﬀ than deep pockets.
Manager M1 retains ownership Financier seizes assets
Posture Value x Owner in t2 Value p Owner in t2
WTP >y y A αy A
WTP ≤   y M1   M2
 <WTP≤ αy < y y M1 = WTP >  M2
 <α y<WTP<y y M1 αy A
 <α y<y= WTP y Ao rM 1 αy A
Table A.1: Asset Valuations and Final Owners (α<1)
Suppose next α ≥ 1. The following asset values and ownership structures are relevant.
Manager M1 retains ownership Financier seizes assets
Posture Value x Owner in t2 Value p Owner in t2
WTP >αy αy A αy A
WTP ≤   y M2   M2
 <WTP≤ y ≤ αy y M2 = WTP >  M2
 <y<WTP<α y = WTP >y M2 = WTP >y M2
 <y≤ αy = WTP αy Ao rM 2 αy Ao rM 2
Table A.2: Asset Valuations and Final Owners (α ≥ 1)
40T h et h i r da n df o u r t hl i s t e dp o s t u r e sy i e l dl o w e rp a y o ﬀs than shallow pockets since they have no
eﬀect on ownership in t2 but do increase the ﬁnancier’s return and the likelihood of entry. The ﬁnal
listed policy yields a lower payoﬀ than deep pockets since it has no eﬀect on ﬁnancier returns (and
the likelihood of entry), but does preclude a sure acquisition in the event of entry.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .The proof is established by the following sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 4. There is a unique D1 ∈ (ΠL,ΠH) such that do-nothing is preferred to acquisition ex
post if and only if D>D 1.
Proof. We know




D ∈ (ΠL,ΠH) ⇒ Ω0
A(D) − Ω0
N(D)=G(D) − H(D) < 0.¥
Using, Lemma 4, the following lemma establishes the point of indiﬀerence between all three
options.
Lemma 5. If (φ,D)=( θy, D1), the incumbent is indiﬀerent ex post between acquisition, predation
and do-nothing.
Proof. Lemma 4 establishes indiﬀerence between N and A at D1. The claimed result then follows
from equation (25).¥
Consider next the choice between P and A. We proceed stepwise for diﬀerent regions of φ,a n d
b e g i nw i t ht h ec a s ew h e nφ is suﬃciently small.
Lemma 6. If φ<y− (1 − θ)∆Π2, then predation is preferred to acquisition ex post for all D.
Proof. Under the stated restriction on φ,
D ≤ ΠL ⇒ ΩP(D) − ΩA(D)=y − (1 − θ)∆Π2 − φ>0.
Further
D ∈ (ΠL,ΠH) ⇒ Ω0
P(D) − Ω0
A(D)=( 1− θ)[H(D) − G(D)] > 0.¥ (52)
41Consider next higher levels of predation costs, with φ ∈ [y − (1 − θ)∆Π2,θy]. For each level of
predation costs on this interval, we deﬁne a debt function D2 (φ) as the locus of points (φ,D) such
that the incumbent is just indiﬀerent between predation and an acquisition. The function D2 (φ) is
deﬁned implicitly by the equation
ΩA[D2(φ)] ≡ ΩP[D2(φ)]. (53)
The following lemma pins down the properties of the schedule D2(φ).
Lemma 7. The debt function D2(φ) deﬁning points of (ex post) indiﬀerence between predation
and acquisition is strictly increasing on its domain [y − (1 − θ)∆Π2,θy] and satisﬁes D2[y −
(1 − θ)∆Π2]=ΠL and D2(θy)=D1.
Proof. If φ = y − (1 − θ)∆Π2, then
ΩP(ΠL)=Π
m
2 − ΠL − y = ΩA(ΠL).




=[ ( 1− θ)(H(D2) − G(D2))]−1.¥
Consider ﬁnally the choice between predation and do-nothing. We deﬁne a debt function D3 (φ)
as the locus of points (φ,D) such that the incumbent is just indiﬀerent between predation and
do-nothing. The function D3 (φ) is deﬁned implicitly by the equation
ΩP[D3(φ)] ≡ ΩN[D3(φ)]. (54)
The following lemma which pins down the properties of the schedule D3(φ).
Lemma 8. The debt function D3(φ) deﬁning points of (ex post) indiﬀerence between predation and
do-nothing is strictly decreasing on [0,θy] and satisﬁes D3(0) = ΠH and D3(θy)=D1.
Proof. If predation costs are zero, indiﬀerence can only be maintained if there is zero chance of
survival. The fact that D3(φ) is decreasing follows from applying the implicit function theorem to
equation (54). The last part of the claim follows from Lemma 5.¥
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Figure 4: The Choice between Predation and Do-Nothing Followed by a Choice Between
Acquisition and Do-Nothing